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(1)  The previous version of the economic projections for 2008 and 2009 was 
presented in more detail in the spring, in the June 2008 issue of the Bank’s 
Economic Review.
Introduction
Since the end of the summer of 2008, the economic out-
look for the next 18 to 24 months has deteriorated very 
rapidly, both worldwide and for the euro area and Belgium. 
The financial tensions which emerged in mid 2007 devel-
oped into a financial crisis which was exceptionally serious 
in its scale, duration and geographical spread, and in the 
diversity  and  size  of  the  financial  players  involved.  The 
effects of contagion on the real economy multiplied and 
became significantly more severe, halting the growth of 
activity in most of the advanced economies and causing 
commodity prices to plummet. As the financial shocks are 
having an impact via various channels – tighter credit con-
ditions, falling stock markets and capital losses, slackening 
global demand and deteriorating confidence – on house-
holds,  non-financial  corporations  and  credit  institutions 
alike, and the absorption of these shocks generally has a 
prolonged effect on activity and demand, the weakness of 
economic activity is likely to persist for several quarters.
The Eurosystem therefore updated its biannual projections 
in a context in which the most negative risks identified 
six  months  earlier  at  the  time  of  the  previous  exercise 
had largely materialised. According to the results for the 
euro area published in the ECB’s December 2008 Monthly 
Bulletin, there will be negative activity growth in 2009 
while inflation is projected to decline as a result of both 
the fall in oil prices and the sharp slowdown in activity. 
Although the uncertainty inherent in any forecasting exer-
cise is particularly great in the present situation, the risks 
are still tending towards a sharper downturn in activity.
In the first three quarters of 2008, the deceleration in GDP 
growth in Belgium was not as marked as in the major 
European countries. However, towards the end of the year 
and in 2009, activity is likely to be affected by the dete-
riorating conditions. This context makes it probable that 
the decline in inflation which began in August 2008 will 
continue. Coinciding with the publication of new projec-
tions for the euro area, this article offers a brief update of 
the results for the Belgian economy  (1). Compiled as part 
of the joint Eurosystem exercise, these results incorporate 
the information available on 20 November 2008. As is 
usual  in  the  case  of  public  finances,  these  projections 
take account only of measures formally approved by the 
authorities, particularly for the 2009 federal budget, on 
which sufficient detail is available.
1.    International environment and 
assumptions
For more than a year, the advanced economies of Europe 
and North America had already been in a cyclical slow-
down phase when in mid September 2008 the financial 
crisis suddenly worsened. Despite action by governments 
and monetary authorities seeking to restore confidence 
in the financial institutions, risk aversion on the financial 
and capital markets became much more acute. In conse-
quence, the fall in stock market prices – down by 25 p.c. 
in Europe between July 2007 and August 2008 – acceler-
ated strongly, reaching a total of 45 p.c. in mid November. 
The widening of interest rate margins which had begun a 
year earlier also intensified significantly. This loss of con-
fidence spread very rapidly, affecting not only the money 
market but also government bonds – particularly those of 
emerging countries – and corporate bonds.





































































































CHART 1  DEVELOPMENTS ON THE FINANCIAL, PROPERTY AND COMMODITY MARKETS
  (monthly averages)
Sources : Bloomberg, EC, ECB, Federal Reserve, ISM, Standard & Poor’s.
(1)  Interest rate on non-collateralised three-month interbank deposits (Euribor for the euro area, Libor for the United States). 
(2)  Fixed rate paid to the party receiving the variable rate (Eonia for the euro area, actual federal funds rate for the US), in a three-month interest rate swap.
(3)  For the euro area, rates on bank loans to non-financial corporations (MIR survey); for the United States, yield on corporate bonds with a BAA rating (Moody’s).
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(1)  On 4 December 2008, at its meeting in Brussels, the Governing Council reduced 
the key rate to 2.5 p.c.
The  financial  market  developments  seriously  depressed 
the  economic  outlook,  while  they  in  turn  were  fuelled 
by the deterioration in the economic environment. Thus, 
business  and  consumer  confidence  indicators,  which 
had  been  falling  since  2007,  virtually  collapsed  from 
September 2008, in both the United States and the euro 
area. Foreign trade has also lost much of its dynamism in 
recent months. In this context, the stagnation or decline 
in activity seen in the advanced economies during 2008 is 
set to continue for several more quarters. Mainly owing to 
the effect of international trade, the economic slowdown 
is  also  spreading  to  the  emerging  economies,  whereas 
they had acted as an engine of growth since the begin-
ning of the millennium. Some of those countries are also 
seriously affected by the drying up of capital inflows in 
the form of direct investment or loans, while commod-
ity producers are being hit by the slump in prices on the 
international markets.
The deteriorating global demand outlook has reversed the 
trend in commodity prices. Thus, having doubled between 
the end of 2003 and the end of 2006, and risen further 
by 2.5 times in 2007 and early 2008 to peak at 145 dol-
lars per barrel of Brent in mid July, oil prices plummeted 
to well below 60 dollars in mid November, thus wiping 
out the increase recorded since the beginning of 2007. 
The pattern was similar for other commodities. The euro’s 
depreciation against the dollar by almost 20 p.c. between 
April and mid November 2008, following an almost con-
stant appreciation since 2002, mitigated the fall in com-
modity prices to some extent.
Taking account of the easing of the inflationary pressure 
resulting from commodity price movements and the sharp 
deceleration in activity, the central banks of the leading 
economies  have  considerably  relaxed  their  monetary 
policy  stance  since  the  summer  of  2008,  including  via 
a coordinated reduction in the key interest rates. In the 
United States, the Federal Reserve continued the process 
of reducing the target federal funds rate which it had initi-
ated in September 2007, cutting it to 1 p.c. The Bank of 
England slashed its key rate by 200 basis points to 3 p.c., 
while the ECB Governing Council reduced the rate of the 
main refinancing operations in two stages by a total of 
100  basis  points.  When  the  forecasts  were  concluded, 
that rate stood at 3.25 p.c.  (1).
The recent movement in commodity prices and exchange 
rates  and  the  easing  of  monetary  policy  should  be 
viewed in the context of the sharp deterioration in the 
economic climate, and will only have a gradual effect in 
bolstering  activity  and  demand.  In  the  current  circum-
stances, the restructuring of the financial sector – via a 
reduction in debt levels and recapitalisation of banking 
institutions – and the evaporation of business and con-
sumer  confidence  are  likely  to  depress  the  economic 
outlook for quite some time.
Thus, the IMF now expects the leading advanced econo-
mies to see a contraction in GDP around the end of 2008 
and in early 2009, and a very modest growth revival in 
the second half of 2009 ; this is a scenario on which most 
forecasters  agree.  For  countries  outside  the  euro  area, 
the volume change in GDP is projected to be negative in 
2009 in the United States and the United Kingdom, with 
falls of 0.7 and 1.3 p.c. respectively. Those economies are 
particularly  hard  hit  by  the  property  market  correction 
and the credit squeeze. The growth prospects were also 
downgraded for the emerging economies. They are still 
robust in China and India, but the adjustment was sharper 
for Brazil and Russia, owing to the slump in income from 
commodities and the drying-up of the capital markets. 
The financial crisis is also spreading its contagion to some 
exposed European economies outside the euro area.
Overall, the volume growth of global GDP is set to slow 
from 5 p.c. in 2007 to 3.7 p.c. in 2008 and 2.2 p.c. in 
2009, the weakest growth since 1993. A corresponding 
slowdown in world trade is also forecast, with expansion 
of only 2.1 p.c. in 2009.
In view of the sluggishness of the global economy and the 
tighter financing conditions, the euro area is also expected 
to experience a period of generally feeble growth up to 
the end of 2009. The decline in GDP seen in the second 
and third quarters of 2008 is likely to persist until the 
beginning of next year, giving way to a fragile recovery.
All components of demand are likely to contribute to the 
weakening of activity. Externally, export growth will suffer 
as a result of the lack of dynamism in world trade. In 
the euro area, corporate investment is set to fall in 2009 
owing to the weakness of demand, the erosion of profit 
margins and the rising financing cost. Investment in hous-
ing is projected to maintain the decline which began in 
2008, owing to the downturn in the property market in 
a number of countries. Finally, having been curbed by the 
recent surge in inflation, private consumption is expected 
to  feel  the  effect  on  household  disposable  income  of 
the  deterioration  in  the  labour  market,  which  will  be 
reflected, in particular, in higher unemployment in 2008 
and 2009. Moreover, the decline in the value of financial 
assets and – in certain countries – property, plus the gen-
eral  climate  of  uncertainty  will  also  depress  household 
spending in 2009.10
Table  1  GDP Growth forecasts for the main economic areas

















World   ..................................... 5.0 3.7 2.2 3.8
of which :
United States  .......................... 2.0 1.4 –0.7 0.6
Japan  ................................. 2.1 0.5 –0.2 1.5
United Kingdom   ........................ 3.0 0.8 –1.3 1.6
China  ................................. 11.9 9.7 8.5 9.5
India  .................................. 9.3 7.8 6.3 8.0
Russia   ................................. 8.1 6.8 3.5 6.3
Brazil  ................................. 5.4 5.2 3.0 3.7
p.m. World trade  ........................... 7.2 4.6 2.1 5.8
Source : IMF (World Economic Outlook – Update, 6 November 2008).
 
Table  2  EurosystEm projEctions


















Inflation (HICP)  ............................. 2.1 3.2 / 3.4 1.1 /   1.7 1.8 4.6 1.9
GDP in volume  ............................. 2.6 0.8 / 1.2 –1.0 /   0.0 2.6 1.4 –0.2
of which :
Private consumption  .................... 1.6 0.1 / 0.5 –0.3 /   0.7 2.0 0.8 0.0
Public consumption  ..................... 2.3 1.9 / 2.3 1.3 /   1.9 2.3 1.8 1.8
Investment  ............................ 4.2 0.2 / 1.2 –6.0 / –3.0 6.1 4.8 –0.9
Exports  ............................... 5.9 2.4 / 3.4 –1.4 /   1.0 3.9 2.4 –0.1
Imports  ............................... 5.4 2.0 / 3.0 –1.9 /   1.1 4.4 4.0 0.3
Sources : ECB, NBB.
 
While the vigour of demand and activity had caused infla-
tion to accelerate sharply in 2007 and early 2008, the 
rapid deterioration in the economic environment is likely 
to bring an appreciable easing of inflationary pressures. 
It is primarily fostering a decline in prices of commodi-
ties, particularly oil. According to the assumptions used 
in the Eurosystem projections, in 2009 those prices are 
expected  to  rise  slightly  above  the  level  to  which  they 
had dropped by mid November 2008, but – at an average 
of 67 dollars per barrel – they will still be well below the 
figures recorded in 2007 and during much of 2008. On 
the domestic front, the continuing sustained rise in labour 
costs, caused in particular by the cyclical weakness of pro-
ductivity gains, will be more than offset by the erosion of 
corporate profit margins.
All in all, according to the Eurosystem projections, having 
reached 2.6 p.c. in 2007, GDP growth in the euro area is 
forecast at between 0.8 and 1.2 p.c. in 2008 and between 
–1 and 0 p.c. in 2009. Inflation is projected to rise from 
2.1 p.c. in 2007 to between 3.2 and 3.4 p.c. in 2008, 
before subsiding to between 1.1 and 1.7 p.c. in 2009.11
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Box – Eurosystem assumptions
The Eurosystem’s economic projections for the euro area and the Bank’s corresponding projections for Belgium are 
based on the following technical assumptions: 
–    The interest rates are based on market expectations. As an annual average, three-month interbank deposit rates 
in euro are forecast to fall from 4.7 p.c. in 2008 to 2.8 p.c. in 2009. That presupposes some normalisation of 
the spreads which have developed in relation to the ECB key rate since August 2007. Yields on ten-year Belgian 
government bonds are projected at 4.5 p.c. in 2008 and 2009. In relation to these benchmark yields, it is also 
assumed that the cost of financing corporate and household investment will be raised by an additional 75 and 
106 basis points respectively.
–    Bilateral euro exchange rates are kept constant at their mid November 2008 level, namely 1.27 US dollar to the 
euro.
–    In accordance with the movement in implicit prices reflected in forward contracts, international market prices 
for a barrel of Brent are expected to average 67.3 dollars in 2009, against 99.9 dollars in 2008.
–    The growth of Belgium’s export markets in real terms, measured as the weighted total of the volume of imports 
of the trading partners, including those in the euro area, is likely to decline from 5.4 p.c. in 2007 to 3.2 p.c. in 
2008 and 0.8 p.c. in 2009.
–    The export prices of euro area competitors are forecast to increase by 2.3 p.c. in 2008 and 1.7 p.c. in 2009.
–    As  is  usual  according  to  the  Eurosystem  conventions,  the  figures  for  public  finances  take  account  of  the 
macroeconomic  environment  and  budget  measures  which  have  already  been  announced  and  have  been 
































ASSUMPTIONS CONCERNING THE MOVEMENT IN OIL PRICES AND INTEREST RATES
Source : ECB.
(1)  Actual figures up to October 2008, assumption from November 2008.
(2)  Actual figures up to the third quarter of 2008, assumption from the fourth quarter of 2008.
In US dollar
In euro
Three-month interbank rates in euro
10-year yield on Belgian bonds
INTEREST RATES (2)
(quarterly averages)
CRUDE OIL PRICE (1)
(monthly averages, barrel of Brent)12









Three-month interbank rates in euro  ....................... 4  .3 4  .7 2  .8
Ten-year bond yields in Belgium  ........................... 4  .3 4  .5 4  .5
Euro exchange rate against the US dollar  ................... 1  .37 1  .46 1  .27
Oil price (US dollar per barrel)  ............................. 72  .7 99  .9 67  .3
(percentage changes)
Export markets relevant to Belgium  ........................ 5  .4 3  .2 0  .8
Competitors’ export prices  ................................ 0  .2 2  .4 3  .8
of which : competitors on the euro area markets   ........... 1  .1 2  .3 1  .7
Source : ECB.
 
2.  Activity, employment and demand
In Belgium, the slowdown in activity which had begun 
in mid 2007 owing to the weakening of foreign demand 
was less pronounced than in the euro area. According 
to the NAI’s official estimates, though real quarterly GDP 
growth  was  weak,  at  0.3  and  0.1  p.c.  respectively  in 
the second and third quarters of 2008, it still remained 
positive, in contrast to what happened in the euro area. In 
particular, domestic demand remained relatively buoyant 
at the beginning of the year, the main impetus coming 
from business investment.
However, the very rapid fall in the business survey indi-
cator  and  the  consumer  confidence  indicator  in  recent 
months  has  shown  that  the  deterioration  in  the  inter-
national economic situation and the worsening financial 
crisis will have a more widespread impact on the econ-
omy. In Belgium as in the euro area, activity is expected 
to contract towards the end of 2008 and in early 2009, 
giving way to a very weak recovery in the ensuing quar-
ters. Thus, the annual average rate of volume GDP growth 
is expected to drop from 2.6 p.c. in 2007 to 1.4 p.c. in 
2008 and -0.2 p.c. in 2009.
In this context, net job creation which had been a sig-
nificant factor supporting the Belgian economy in the last 
three years is expected to decelerate in 2009, declining 
from an annual average of over 65,000 between 2005 
and 2008 to less than 8,000 in 2009. This figure actually   
reflects  the  expansion  achieved  during  2008  since, 
  according to the projections, the number of persons in 
work is likely to fall by almost 8,000 units between the 
fourth quarter of this year and the end of 2009.
Expressed as the percentage change, the annual average 
growth of domestic employment in persons is forecast to 
fall from 1.8 p.c. in 2007 to 1.5 p.c. in 2008 and 0.2 p.c. 
in 2009. In the latter year, employment growth will there-
fore outpace GDP growth. There are various reasons why 
employment  is  less  responsive  to  cyclical  fluctuations. 
First, in some branches of activity, employment is not very 
sensitive to cyclical movements. That applies, for example, 
to  the  health  sector  and  personal  services.  The  service 
voucher system is also expected to continue expanding 
in 2009, though at a more modest pace than in previous 
years. Next, even in sectors which are sensitive to the busi-
ness cycle, employment exhibits a degree of inertia. The 
main factor here is the time and cost entailed in making 
staff redundant, or in recruiting staff during a recovery 
period.  Also,  firms  begin  by  adjusting  the  number  of 
hours worked, especially by cutting overtime or resorting 
to temporary lay-offs, while maintaining their workforce 
if  possible.  Thus,  the  expected  increase  in  the  number 
of persons in work corresponds to a 0.3 p.c. reduction 
in the volume of labour in 2009. Apparent productivity 
per hour worked is set to stagnate in 2008 and in 2009 ; 
expressed per worker, it is actually likely to show a slight 
fall, following an average rise of 1.1 p.c. during the period 
2000-2007.13




























CHART 2  GDP, BUSINESS SURVEY INDICATOR AND EMPLOYMENT
  (seasonally adjusted data)
Sources : NAI, NBB.




Overall synthetic curve (right-hand scale)
Percentage changes compared to 
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Although  the  labour  force  is  expected  to  grow  more 
slowly in 2009 than during the period of sustained activity 
expansion between 2005 and 2008, that growth will still 
outstrip the rise in the number of persons in work. Thus, 
the unemployment rate is forecast to rise from 6.6 p.c. in 
the fourth quarter of 2008 to 7.1 p.c. in the fourth quar-
ter of 2009, after having recorded a fall of 2.1 percentage 
points over the four preceding years. As an annual aver-
age, the unemployment rate will increase from 6.7 p.c. in 
2008 to 6.9 p.c. in 2009.
The  repercussions  of  the  global  financial  crisis  are  felt 
via various channels, and ultimately affect all the main 
expenditure  categories.  In  this  way,  having  been  the 
main engine of GDP growth between 2004 and the first 
half of 2008, domestic demand will virtually stagnate in 
2009. That is likely to reduce demand for imports so that 
the  contribution  of  net  exports  to  GDP  growth  should 
be  only  slightly  negative,  in  contrast  to  2008,  though 
































CHART 3  MAIN EXPENDITURE CATEGORIES
  (calendar adjusted volume data, contribution to the change in 
GDP, unless otherwise stated)
Sources : NAI, NBB.
(1)  Annual percentage changes.
Domestic expenditure excluding change in stocks









Table  3  GDP, emPloyment anD main cateGories of exPenDiture










GDP  (1)   ................................................. 3.0 2.6 1.4 –0.2
Total domestic employment in persons  ..................... 1.4 1.8 1.5 0.2
Total volume of labour  (2)   .................................. 1.5 2.0 1.4 –0.3
Real disposable income  ................................... 2.5 2.8 –0.3 1.5
Components of expenditure  (1)
Final consumption expenditure of individuals  ................ 2.1 2.0 0.8 0.0
Final consumption expenditure of general government   ........ 0.1 2.3 1.8 1.8
Gross fixed capital formation  .............................. 4.8 6.1 4.8 –0.9
Housing  .............................................. 7.9 1.3 0.8 –0.5
Government  .......................................... –10.6 3.4 –4.4 7.5
Business  .............................................. 5.6 8.5 7.4 –1.9
p.m. Domestic expenditure excluding change in stocks  (3)   ...... 2.1 2.8 1.9 0.2
Change in stocks  (3)  ...................................... 0.9 0.1 0.8 –0.1
Net exports of goods and services  (3)  ........................ 0.1 –0.3 –1.3 –0.3
Exports of goods and services  ........................... 2.7 3.9 2.4 –0.1
Imports of goods and services  ........................... 2.7 4.4 4.0 0.3
Sources : NAI, NBB.
(1)  In volume.
(2)  Total number of hours worked in the economy.
(3)  Contribution to the change in GDP.
 
In fact, the volume of exports is set to fall by 0.1 p.c. 
in 2009, compared to an increase of 2.4 p.c. in 2008. 
The  deterioration  in  the  global  economic  climate  is 
therefore probably the first channel through which the 
financial  crisis  will  affect  the  Belgian  economy,  via  the 
marked slowdown in foreign demand, taking account of 
Belgium’s very open economy. According to the assump-
tions used in this exercise, the decelerating expansion of 
export  markets  which  began  in  2008  will  become  still 
more marked, since growth will total only 3.2 p.c. this 
year and 0.8 p.c. in 2009. That is the weakest annual 
expansion since 1993, well below the average growth of 
7.5 p.c. recorded between 2004 and 2007.
Having  been  curbed  in  2008  by  the  slight  fall  in  real 
disposable income due mainly to higher inflation, private 
consumption is not forecast to rise in 2009, mainly owing 
to the stock market slide and the ensuing rise in the sav-
ings  ratio.  The  fall  in  share  prices  since  the  beginning 
of 2008, amounting to around 45 p.c. in Belgium as in 
most other European financial centres, has in fact led to 
a 15 p.c. reduction in the net financial assets of house-
holds. Even though the wealth effects have so far been 
relatively moderate in Belgium, a drop on that scale would 
depress private consumption for the next two to three 
years by 1.5 percentage point, as there is no likelihood of 
any immediate upturn. That effect will largely materialise 
in  2009,  so  that,  in  parallel  with  stagnating  consump-
tion, the savings ratio will rise from 12.7 p.c. in 2008 to 
14.3 p.c. in 2009, as households set aside a larger part of 
their income for the rebuilding of their assets. The sharp 
deterioration  in  consumer  confidence  since  September 
2008 should be viewed in this context, although it is also 
a more general reflection of the fear of worsening eco-
nomic conditions and labour market prospects.
In  these  bleak  circumstances,  business  investment  is 
forecast to fall by 1.9 p.c. in 2009, following more than 
four years of vigorous expansion right up to 2008, a year 
in  which  investment  grew  by  an  estimated  7.4  p.c.  In 
addition to the weakening of demand for exports and 
consumption, there are similarly cyclical pressures depress-
ing operating margins and hence the internal financing 
capacity of companies. Furthermore, external finance has 
also become more expensive owing to both the increase 
in  the  rates  charged  on  loans  and  the  higher  cost  of 15
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raising finance by issuing shares or bonds. These develop-
ments are also due to the stronger risk aversion caused by 
the financial crisis.
The widening of interest margins on mortgage loans is 
contributing to the expected 0.5 p.c. decline in invest-
ment in housing in 2009. However, this deceleration was 
already apparent in 2007, coinciding with a steady easing 
of price rises on the secondary property market.
3.  Prices and costs
Inflation has eased in Belgium, having risen rapidly from 
October 2007 and peaked at 5.9 p.c. in July 2008, when 
it was 1.9 points above the level for the euro area. This 
fall should continue during the closing months of the year 
and  for  much  of  2009.  Measured  by  the  HICP,  overall 
inflation is thus estimated at an average of 1.9 p.c. in 
2009, compared to 4.6 p.c. in 2008. The health index, 
which is used as the reference for the indexation of wages 
and social benefits, is expected to increase by 4.3 p.c. in 
2008 and 2.3 p.c. in 2009.
Just as the energy and food components of the consumer 
price index were the source of rising inflation in recent 
months, they are also the reason for its decline. On the 
one hand, the basis effects caused by increases in food 
prices will gradually fade away as commodities are not 
expected to increase further in price, in contrast to 2007. 
Also, according to the assumptions used in this exercise, 
oil prices should remain steady in 2009 at around 67 dol-
lars per barrel, well below the price prevailing for much of 
2008. Consumer prices of energy are therefore projected 
to fall by 3.6 p.c. in 2009, in contrast to the rise of over 
20 p.c. recorded in 2008. The rise in electricity and gas 
distribution  and  transport  charges  has  also  contributed 
significantly to this increase, whereas the government’s 
decision to raise excise duty by reactivating the ratchet 
system  is  expected  to  have  only  a  limited  impact  in 
2009.
However, the decline in overall inflation is partly offset by 
the faster increases in service prices. For this component, 
which represents around 37 p.c. of the consumer price 
index,  inflation  went  up  from  1.5  p.c.  in  the  first  five 
months of 2008 to 3.2 p.c. in October. According to the 
projections, it is set to average 3.9 p.c. in 2009. A more 
detailed breakdown shows that various factors are con-
tributing to this rise. First, indirect effects due to energy 
and food price increases are gradually working their way 
through in transport, tourism and catering services, for 
which these products are major inputs. Next, the move-
ment in the prices of certain services such as rents and 




































CHART 4  INFLATION
  (HICP, percentage changes compared to the corresponding period of the previous year)
Sources : EC, NBB.
1  Impact on overall inflation, in percentage points, of price changes connected with measures concerning the radio & television licence fee and changes to network industry 
tariffs.
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some  government-regulated  charges  generally  mirror 
inflation. Finally, and more generally, a fairly widespread 
acceleration in inflation has been evident since September 
2008  for  the  other  service  components,  possibly  on 
account of the increase in labour costs.
The change in unit labour costs in the private sector is 
estimated  respectively  at  3.1  p.c.  in  2007,  3.8  p.c.  in 
2008 and 3.2 p.c. in 2009, compared to an annual aver-
age rise of 0.7 p.c. during the period 2002-2006. This 
steep increase is due both to the fall in labour productivity   
–  already  appreciable  in  2007,  owing  to  the  marked 
expansion of employment in the private sector, and fur-
ther reinforced in 2008 and in 2009, as a result of the 
prolonged weakness of economic activity – and to the 
continuing sustained rise in hourly labour costs.
The accelerating pace of the increase in hourly labour costs 
in 2007 and in 2008 occurred in the context of the per-
sistent pressure on certain labour market segments, in the 
wake of the economic boom. In addition, two temporary 
factors – namely the earlier payment of the holiday allow-
ance on termination of a contract of employment, and the 
payment of redundancy allowances in connection with the 
restructuring of large companies – accentuated the rise in 
hourly labour costs in 2007, by a total of around 0.6 per-
centage point. Although these factors have the opposite 
effect on the movement in labour costs in 2008, that is not 
enough to offset the greater impact of indexation.
For  2009,  the  3.3  p.c.  increase  in  hourly  labour  costs 
assumed for the purpose of this exercise essentially corre-
sponds to the expected effect of indexation, which takes 
some time to react to the 2008 acceleration in inflation 
measured by the health index. This assumption is in line 
with that made by the Secretariat of the Central Economic 
Council, taking account of the adjustment to the outlook 
for growth and inflation in recent months. It does not in 
any way anticipate the outcome of the current negotia-
tions between the social partners.
4.  Public finances
According to the latest information, public finances are 
expected to end the year 2008 with a deficit of 0.9 p.c. of 
GDP. In the macroeconomic context described above, that 
deficit would reach 1.7 p.c. of GDP in 2009.
These projections take account of the impact of the vari-
ous measures taken by the government in response to the 
financial crisis, such as the provision of funds for financial 
institutions  in  the  form  of  capital  injections  or  loans, 
and the provision of guarantees. The funding of these 
measures by the Belgian government increased the con-
solidated gross public debt by 6.1 p.c. of GDP. The slightly 
negative impact of these measures on the overall balance 
in 2008 is expected to disappear in 2009 since, according 
to  the  estimates,  revenue  from  interest,  dividends  and 
fees paid for the provision of guarantees will then slightly 
exceed the additional interest charges payable by the gov-
ernment. However, these numbers disregard the indirect 
effects of the financial crisis, such as the repercussions on 
economic activity and the level of interest rates, and it is   
assumed that no guarantees will be invoked.
Expressed as a percentage of GDP, public revenues are 
projected to rise from 48.1 p.c. in 2007 to 48.5 in 2008, 
dropping to 48.3 p.c. in 2009. Nevertheless, in 2008 they 
will reflect the downward influence of various structural 
measures,  as  well  as  the  disappearance  of  a  range  of 
non-recurring measures which had increased revenues in   
2007. However, this impact is more than offset by the fact   
that earned incomes, which are taxed at a relatively higher   
Table  4  Price and cost indicators










Total HICP  .............................................. 2.3 1.8 4.6 1.9
of which : energy products  .............................. 7.3 0.2 20.6 –3.6
GDP deflator   ............................................ 2.3 2.4 2.2 3.0
Labour costs in the private sector :
Unit labour costs  ...................................... 1.5 3.1 3.8 3.2
Hourly labour costs  .................................... 3.1 3.7 3.5 3.3
Sources : EC, NAI, NBB.
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Revenues  ............................................... 48.7 48.1 48.5 48.3
of which : fiscal and parafiscal revenues   ................... 43.8 43.3 43.6 43.1
Primary expenditure   ...................................... 44.4 44.5 45.7 46.3
Primary balance  ......................................... 4.3 3.5 2.8 2.1
Interest charges  ......................................... 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.8
Financing requirement (–) or capacity   ....................... 0.3 –0.3 –0.9 –1.7
p.m. Effect of non-recurring measures   ...................... 0.8 –0.2 –0.4 0.1
Consolidated gross debt  .................................. 87.8 83.9 87.8 87.6
Sources : NAI, NBB.
(1)  According to the methodology used in the excessive deficit procedure (EDP).
 
rate, are projected to grow significantly faster than GDP 
in nominal terms. What is more, owing to the rising infla-
tion, payroll tax will increase faster than earned incomes. 
In 2009, fiscal and parafiscal revenues are projected to 
contract significantly in relation to GDP. That is due mainly 
to  various  structural  measures  passed  by  the  federal 
government and affecting personal income tax, and to 
the increase in the tax reduction granted by the Flemish 
Region. However, this fall will be partly offset by the pro-
ceeds generated by measures which the government has 
taken on account of the financial crisis.
Primary  expenditure,  which  came  to  44.5  p.c.  of  GDP 
in 2007, should increase to 45.7 and 46.3 p.c. of GDP 
respectively in 2008 and in 2009. The real trend growth 
of  primary  expenditure  will  be  slightly  higher  than  the 
trend growth of GDP in those two years. Expenditure on 
health care and pensions, in particular, is projected to rise 
substantially.
The  borrowing  requirement  estimated  at  1.7  p.c.  of 
GDP  for  2009  is  a  particularly  marked  deviation  from 
the  balanced  budget  targeted  by  the  government  for 
this year. There are various reasons for this divergence. 
First, the general government budget assumes economic 
growth of 1.2 p.c. in 2009, i.e. a far more optimistic sce-
nario than the macroeconomic outlook described above. 
Consequently,  the  projected  revenues  fall  well  short  of 
the figure anticipated in the general government budget, 
especially  as  tax  revenues  are  estimated  taking  into 
account  a  less  favourable  basis  for  2008.  Furthermore, 
according  to  the  ESCB  methodology,  the  projections 
disregard budget measures for which details are not yet 
available. That applies, for instance, to the possible levies 
on electricity producers and to much of the revenue to 
be generated by the measures designed to combat tax 
evasion and social security fraud. Finally, the government 
assumes that the communities and regions and the local 
authorities will together record a surplus of 0.4 p.c. of 
GDP in 2009, whereas the estimates suggest that they will 
show a deficit of 0.1 p.c. of GDP.
A  break  in  the  downward  trend  in  the  debt  ratio  is 
expected in 2008. At the end of this year, the government 
debt would total 87.8 p.c. of GDP, or around 4 percent-
age points above the level recorded at the end of 2007. 
This increase is due to loans taken out by the Belgian State 
to finance the injections of capital into financial institu-
tions and the loans granted to them. In 2009, the public 
debt ratio would fall again, although much more slowly 
than in previous years owing to the relatively low nominal 
GDP growth and the expanding borrowing requirement.
5.  Assessment of the risk factors
While the spring projections for Belgium estimated GDP 
growth at 1.5 p.c. in 2009, the Bank now expects activ-
ity to contract by 0.2 p.c. The exceptionally large scale 
of  this  adjustment  is  similar  to  the  adjustment  to  the 
corresponding  projections  for  the  euro  area.  It  reflects 
the general and very rapid deterioration in the economic 
outlook since the end of September 2008. The forecasts 
produced by various institutions at the end of the summer 
still expected GDP to grow by more than 1 p.c. in 2009. 
In view of the recent developments, all institutions are 
now expecting GDP to contract in late 2008 and early 
2009, with a subsequent very weak recovery.18
Table  6  Comparison of the foreCasts for Belgium






















NBB – Autumn 2008   ........................ 1.4 –0.2 4.6 1.9 –0.9 –1.7 December 2008
p.m. Spring 2008   ........................... 1.6 1.5 4.1 2.3 –0.3 –0.8 June 2008
NAI  ....................................... 1.6 1.2 4.7 2.7 n. n. September 2008
EC  ....................................... 1.4 0.1 4.7 2.5 –0.5 –1.4 3 November 2008
OECD  ..................................... 1.5 –0.1 4.6 1.9 –0.7 –1.3 25 November 2008
Belgian Prime News  ......................... 1.6 1.3 4.5 2.4 –0.4 –0.7 September 2008
(1)  HICP, except for NAI : national consumer price index.
(2)  Percentages of GDP.
 
The  scenarios  for  a  marked  worsening  of  the  financial 
crisis  and  its  spread  to  the  real  economy,  mentioned 
among  the  potential  risks  when  the  previous  exer-
cises were published, have therefore largely materialised. 
Nevertheless,  the  uncertainty  surrounding  the  current 
forecasts still seems to be very considerable, though the 
risk of a sharper downturn in activity is dominant. Indeed, 
past experience of banking and financial crises in various 
countries has shown that their effects may be substantial 
and long-lasting.
For the moment, it is uncertain whether the worst of the 
crisis is already – or almost – over, particularly as regards 
the increased cost of funding sources or the fall in stock 
market  prices.  Non-financial  corporations  and  house-
holds could also face credit restrictions. The scale of the 
effects of the crisis on economic activity and world trade 
is another major factor of uncertainty. The slump in busi-
ness and consumer confidence, but also the plummeting 
commodity prices on the international markets, indicate 
that there is now a widespread impact on the expecta-
tions of economic agents as regards activity, demand and 
incomes. The restoration of a degree of macroeconomic 
stability is therefore a primary requirement for a recovery 
in economic activity.
Variations between inflation forecasts are largely attribut-
able to the assumptions made regarding oil prices. In view 
of the recent sharp fall in those prices, the latest inflation 
forecasts for 2009 are generally lower, down to around or 
below 2 p.c. In the short term, a more marked slowdown 
in activity would cause the inflationary pressures to ease 
further  via  an  additional  fall  in  commodity  prices  or  a 
more marked erosion of corporate margins.19
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growth (calendar adjusted data)
GDP in volume  .......................................... 2.2 3.0 2.6 1.4 –0.2
Contributions to growth :
Domestic expenditure, excluding change in stocks   .......... 2.3 2.1 2.8 1.9 0.2
Net exports of goods and services  ....................... –0.6 0.1 –0.3 –1.3 –0.3
Change in stocks  ...................................... 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.8 –0.1
Prices and costs
Harmonised index of consumer prices  ...................... 2.5 2.3 1.8 4.6 1.9
Health index  ............................................ 2.2 1.8 1.8 4.3 2.3
GDP deflator   ............................................ 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.2 3.0
Terms of trade  .......................................... –0.3 –0.7 0.5 –3.0 1.1
Unit labour costs in the private sector  ...................... 0.9 1.5 3.1 3.8 3.2
Hourly labour costs in the private sector  .................... 2.4 3.1 3.7 3.5 3.3
Hourly productivity in the private sector  .................... 1.5 1.6 0.6 –0.3 0.1
labour market
Domestic employment  
(annual average change in thousands of persons)  ............ 54.8 58.1 77.4 67.5 7.9
Total volume of labour  (1)   .................................. 0.9 1.5 2.0 1.4 –0.3
Harmonised unemployment rate  (2) (p.c. of the labour force)  . .. 8.5 8.3 7.5 6.7 6.9
incomes
Real disposable income of individuals   ....................... 0.4 2.5 2.8 –0.3 1.5
Savings ratio of individuals (p.c. of disposable income)  ........ 12.6 12.9 13.7 12.7 14.3
Public finances  (3)
Overall balance (p.c. of GDP)  .............................. –2.6 0.3 –0.3 –0.9 –1.7
Primary balance (p.c. of GDP)  ............................. 1.6 4.3 3.5 2.8 2.1
Public debt (p.c. of GDP)  ................................. 92.1 87.8 83.9 87.8 87.6
current account  
(according to the balance of payments, p.c. of GDP)  ......... 2.6 2.0 1.7 –2.0 –1.4
Sources : EC, DGSEI, NAI, NBB.
(1)  Total number of hours worked in the economy.
(2)  Adjusted series (Eurostat).
(3)  According to the methodology used in the excessive deficit procedure (EDP).
 
Annex